Polina Sokolovska, Pupil Barrister at 12 King’s Bench Walk, examines Boate v Twin Ventures International Ltd [2026] EWCC 66, where the Central London County Court considered whether the administration of an incorrectly prescribed drug could constitute an ‘accident’ for the purposes of a secondary victim claim.


Introduction

Two years ago, the Supreme Court in Paul v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust [2024] UKSC 1 clarified that secondary victims can only recover damages for psychiatric injury if they witness an ‘accident’, defined as an ‘unexpected and unintended event which causes injury (or a risk of injury) to a victim by violent external means’ ([24] and [52]). Although the Supreme Court found that none of the three appeals involved an ‘accident’ in the relevant sense, it left open the question as to when such situations could ever arise in a medical negligence setting.

One hypothetical scenario discussed in Paul at [123] involved a doctor injecting a patient with the wrong dose or drug, inducing an acute adverse reaction that is witnessed by a close relative. The Court declined to determine whether such circumstances would constitute an ‘accident’, considering that the issue was better addressed when it actually arose on the facts.

It would appear that this situation has finally arisen in Boate v Twin Ventures International Ltd [2026] EWCC 66. Or has it?

Facts

This claim was brought by the mother of an infant who was born with untreatable complex congenital conditions (not as a result of any negligence). The hospital discharged the infant on a home-based palliative care plan, which included administering a morphine solution through a naso-gastric tube for pain and distressed breathing as required.

The Claimant had previously administered morphine to her daughter on a number of occasions without issue. However, when a new supply was requested in August 2020, the Second Defendant, the infant’s GP surgery, issued a prescription for morphine with confusing and contradictory instructions as to the dosage of the medication. The pharmacist, an employee of the First Defendant, subsequently dispensed a morphine solution that was twenty times more concentrated than appropriate.

On 3 September 2020, the Claimant administered the supplied morphine to her daughter, who instantly collapsed and stopped breathing normally. Her condition deteriorated and she died six days later.

The Claimant brought a claim for psychiatric injury as a result of these events.

The Application

The Defendants applied for strike out and summary judgment, arguing that the claim had no prospects of success because the Claimant’s administration of morphine could not satisfy the definition of an ‘accident’ established by the Supreme Court in Paul. The Defendants submitted that the test requires the secondary victim witnessing the act to be aware that the act is capable of causing injury, whereas in this case, the Claimant thought that the morphine was therapeutic when administering the fatal dose.

Held

HHJ Holmes dismissed the applications, concluding that the claim had a real prospect of success.

The Court’s Reasoning

First, HHJ Holmes decided that administration of medication via a naso-gastric tube could amount to a ‘violent external means’ by causing the primary victim injury. The judge acknowledged that a line must be drawn between ‘violence’ and ‘a touching’. However, he did not interpret the Supreme Court judgment as setting a ‘minimum threshold’ by using the word ‘violent’. He stated that the Court intended to convey that there needed to be ‘some sort of event which is external to the person which exposes them to physical injury or the risk of physical injury.’ [37]

The judge considered that the injection of medication would meet this requirement, and he could see no reason to distinguish between the administration of medication by injection and through a naso-gastric tube.

HHJ Holmes acknowledged that there was ‘considerable force’ in the Defendants’ arguments that the Claimant could not have anticipated that administering morphine would cause her daughter harm, but he did not consider this determinative [38]. Provided that the Claimant could establish an immediate or almost immediate connection between the administration of morphine and her daughter’s acute reaction, then this would be sufficient to satisfy the definition of an ‘accident’ in Paul.

Secondly, the judge stated that to determine whether something was an ‘accident’ per Paul, it was necessary to consider it in light of proximity and reasonable foreseeability of harm [42]. The Claimant was the mother of the primary victim, she administered the drug personally and it was reasonably foreseeable that she would suffer psychiatric injury upon realising what had happened. Therefore, HHJ Holmes considered that there was ‘little doubt’ that the Claimant would satisfy any test of proximity proposed.

The judge further distinguished these circumstances from the facts in Paul. Unlike the Claimants in Paul, Ms Boate was an integral part of her daughter’s palliative care, and the Defendants must have known that she would administer the supplied morphine. In those circumstances, HHJ Holmes considered that they owed her a duty of care to ensure that they do not negligently prescribe and dispense medication that would place her in the position of unwittingly administering a toxic substance to her daughter. This made the circumstances ‘qualitatively different’ from the facts in Paul. The judge considered that a parallel could be drawn with cases of involuntary participation in negligence such as Dooley v Cammell Laird & Co. Ltd. [1951] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 271 and Gait v British Railways Board (1983) 133 N.L.J. 870 [41].

Comment

The decision in Boate provides an illustration of how a secondary victim claim arising from medical negligence may survive the requirement for an ‘accident’ imposed by the Supreme Court in Paul. HHJ Holmes indicated that both an injection and the administration of medication through a naso-gastric tube could satisfy the requirement of an ‘accident’ provided it has an immediate or almost immediate and acute effect on the primary victim. This indication provides some guidance on the hypothetical scenario left unresolved at [123] of Paul.

However, the broader implications of Boate should be approached with caution. First, as a County Court decision concerning applications for strike out and summary judgment, it is not binding authority and establishes only that the claim has a real prospect of success, rather than that the requirements for liability have been satisfied.

Secondly, the unusual circumstances of the Claimant’s involvement in the administration of the negligently prescribed and dispensed medication may limit the extent to which the decision can be applied to other medical negligence claims. HHJ Holmes considered that a parallel could be drawn between this case and the cases of Dooley, Galt and Wigg, which involved involuntary participation in another person’s injury where the claimant may arguably be classed as a primary victim. Considering the significance that HHJ Holmes placed on the status of the Claimant as an involuntary participant in negligence, particularly as a feature that is ‘qualitatively different’ from Paul, this begs the question of whether Boate is properly understood as a conventional secondary victim claim at all. In particular, it remains uncertain whether the same conclusion would be reached if a relative merely witnesses a medical professional administering the wrong medication, as contemplated in Paul at [123].

Overall, Boate may offer a glimmer of hope to claimants seeking to establish secondary victim liability in a medical negligence setting, although its wider significance remains to be seen.