William Audland KC and Isaac Hogarth of 12 King’s Bench Walk, instructed by Alison Goldney of Stewarts successfully acted for the Claimant (C) in her clinical negligence claim against Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust (D).

This case summary of PCY v Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust is written by Charlotte Buck, pupil barrister at 12 King’s Bench Walk.

The Facts

In 2017, C was diagnosed with a nerve sheath tumour.  In January 2018, she underwent a surveillance MRI scan under the care of D. The tumour was reported as stable.

C’s case was that the MRI had been negligently reported. In fact, there had been a subtle enlargement of the sacral mass, together with other radiological changes which ought to have raised concerns about malignancy. It later transpired that C had a Ewing Sarcoma and the negligent reporting resulted in a delayed diagnosis of the same. As consequence of that delay, C developed Cauda Equina Syndrome and permanent S2 ASIA A paraplegia.

The Defendant denied the allegations, asserting that the MRI was not negligently reported and that earlier treatment would not have prevented C’s neurological deterioration.

The Application

A trial on liability was scheduled to begin within a 5-day window commencing on the 20th April 2026.

Directions had been provided for the experts’ joint discussions to take place in November 2025. However, following multiple extension requests from D, those discussions were postponed until March 2026.

Upon receipt of the neurosurgeons’ joint statement, it became apparent that both neurosurgeons agreed that had malignancy been suspected earlier, C would have been referred to a sarcoma multi-disciplinary team (MDT). This was a change in the position of C’s neurosurgeon and created an evidential gap as neither neurosurgeon could provide definitive evidence on what the sarcoma surgeons would have done.

To address this, C urgently sought the opinion of a spinal sarcoma surgeon, who happened to be the clinical lead for spinal surgery at the very hospital where C would have been referred to but for the negligence. ​ The expert’s preliminary report supported C’s case, stating that earlier referral and treatment would likely have prevented neurological deterioration.

As trial was fast approaching, C made an urgent application to rely on this new expert evidence, and to adjourn causation.

The application was heard by Mr. Justice Griffiths on the 13th of April 2026.

C proposed that the trial on the issue of breach of duty should proceed as scheduled, as it could potentially be determinative of the case. ​ It was argued that if D was successful on the breach of duty aspect of the claim, the case would be dismissed, eliminating the need for further proceedings on causation. ​ However, if C were to succeed, the causation issue could then be adjourned to allow D time to obtain its own expert evidence from a spinal sarcoma surgeon. ​ This approach was suggested to reduce wasted costs and court time while ensuring fairness to both parties.

The application was resisted by D as being simply too late. D argued that the need for sarcoma‑related causation evidence had always been apparent and that C was now seeking to cure a forensic weakness at the last moment. D further disagreed with C’s submission that if the application was not allowed the evidential gap would likely result in C’s case failing. Arguments were also made that allowing the application would result in a real prejudice for D said to arise through D’s limited costs recovery potential under QOCS.

Standing back, the Judge concluded that although the application was late, it was late for good reason. The concession by C’s neurosurgeon in the joint statement was significant and genuinely unexpected. Furthermore, the lateness arose largely because expert discussions had been pushed close to trial by D. Refusing permission would risk an unjust outcome, where C lost not on merit, but because she had not been allowed a fair opportunity to address the gap in her evidence. While some prejudice to D was accepted, it did not outweigh that injustice.

Griffiths J allowed C’s application and ordered for the trial listed for the following week to proceed limited to the issue of breach of duty only.

Settlement

Shortly after C’s successful application, the parties reached a settlement of £3 million.